Jean Paul Révauger

FRE Europe Européanité Européanisation

Université de Bordeaux.

 

Risque, protection sociale et libéralisme. Réflexions pour une comparaison France/Grande-Bretagne.

L’opposition entre  le système français et le  système britannique a un caractère un peu rituel, quelle que  soit la position politique adoptée par l’analyste. Pour les néo libéraux, britanniques ou français, le système français serait « risk adverse » et perverti par une frilosité excessive à l’égard du marché et de la libre concurrence. A l’inverse, le système britannique encouragerait la prise de risque et le dynamisme économique. En fin de compte, la prospérité transiterait à travers les filtres institutionnels sous pression, et , tel un expresso, l’augmentation du niveau de vie  retrouverait dans toutes les tasses[1]. Pour les opposants à ce  récit, la recherche d’une protection contre les risques s’est toujours accompagnée de résistances de la part des classes possédantes, et la singularité de la période contemporaine n’est due qu’à la rupture de l’équilibre social, et la perte d’influence du monde du travail depuis les années 80[2]. Une analyse des deux pays permet de dépasser les clivages institutionnels et de comprendre à la fois la singularité des héritages nationaux, et la similitude des problèmes.

 

Les origines.

Le système français de protection sociale a une origine historique complexe. Le substrat est d’origine germanique, pour des raisons tenant à la fortune des armes, et absolument pas à la culture politique des deux pays.  Le système bismarckien mis en place à la fin du XIX^eme siècle dans l’empire, fut en effet appliqué à l’Alsace et à la Moselle, perdues en 1871. Ces régions étant revenues dans le giron français en 1918, il fut en fin de compte décidé d’étendre l’utile  régime de protection sociale qui y avait été établi à l’ensemble du territoire métropolitain de la République. C’est donc un système fondé sur l’identité professionnelle, structuré en branches et financé par des cotisations de sécurité sociale et donc le principe assuranciel, qui fut mis en place dans les années 20 et 30. Les cotisations correspondaient à des « risques » définis, de façon séparée, et couverts également par des financements spécifiques.[3]

Toutefois, pendant la seconde guerre mondiale, les Free French qui entouraient le Général de Gaulle furent emportés par l’enthousiasme que suscita le rapport Beveridge, publié en 1942. Celui-ci était fondé sur des principes totalement différents. Les droits n’étaient plus déterminés par l’identité professionnelle, et les prélèvements n’étaient plus effectués pour financer de façon séparée la lutte contre les « cinq géants », à savoir l’oisiveté, l’ignorance, le besoin, la maladie et l’habitat insalubre. Il y avait donc mutualisation des risques.  Certes, Beveridge raisonnait en homme prudent, et selon la logique prudentielle des assurances. En théorie, le système devait être autofinancé, et le niveau de couverture dépendrait de l’état des comptes.  Toutefois, dès que le  système fut mis en place après la guerre, le financement fut assuré par l’impôt en sus des cotisations sociales, et la logique prudentielle fut abandonnée. Cela n’est d’ailleurs nullement synonyme d’incurie et de laxisme comptable. Le système britannique ignore le « déficit de la sécu », et l’offre de soins du NHS dépend étroitement du budget qui lui est alloué chaque année. Le risque social est donc perçu dans sa globalité, et sa couverture est une affaire d’Etat. Contrairement à la France, les comptes sociaux font partie du budget de l’Etat. Notons que ce principe de financement n’a pas un impact automatique sur le niveau de couverture des risques. Contrairement à ce qui est affirmé par les partisans inconditionnels du corporatisme d’origine bismarckienne, la générosité ou la rigueur d’un système ne dépend ni de la méthode de collecte des fonds, ni des structures administratives de la distribution. Les pays nordiques, avec un système universel de type beveridgien, ont une politique sociale beaucoup hardie et redistributive que la Grande-Bretagne. Tout dépend du poids politique des acteurs sociaux. [4]

La France, sur un substrat bismarckien, a rajouté peu à peu des éléments universalistes lorsqu’elle a édifié sa sécurité sociale. Notons que, sur le plan politique, ce sont les agriculteurs, les commerçants et artisans et les personnels d’encadrement qui ont refusé l’universalisme à la Libération. Leur refus d’adhérer au Régime Général des salariés était motivé par un souci de différenciation sociale, et par la crainte de voir leur protection sociale gérée par un syndicat de salariés, en pratique, à l’époque, la CGT. C’est même à cette occasion qu’une  curieuse catégorie celle des « cadres » fut inventée. Son existence et sa définition plongent dans la plus grande perplexité les observateurs étrangers, qui ne connaissent  aucun équivalent. Le risque fut donc communautarisé pour certaines catégories, qu’il s’agisse de santé ou de retraites. Il est ironique de constater que l’évolution de l’économie a rendu cette stratégie intenable. En effet, le nombre d’agriculteurs, de commerçants et d’artisans en âge de travailler et de cotiser s’est effondré à partir  les années 1960, ce qui a imposé tout d’abord de ponctionner la caisse du Régime Général pour financer la couverture  de personnes qui avaient refusé d’y adhérer. Peu à peu, des dispositions universalistes ont également été introduites pour assurer une couverture à des personnes qui n’avaient jamais cotisé, comme les épouses de commerçants ou d’agriculteurs, et qui n’avaient donc, aux yeux de l’administration sociale aucune existence malgré leur vie de labeur non déclaré.

Au moment où prennent fin les 30 glorieuses, donc, pour la GB au début des années 70 et pour la France au début des années 80, les principaux « risques » sont à peu près couverts, avec des méthodes différentes, dans les deux pays. Il y a certes des poches de pauvreté résiduelle, des bidonvilles existent encore en I971/72. Mais la montée en puissance des régimes de retraite a à peu près éliminé la grande pauvreté chez les personnages âgées, les deux pays disposant en outre d ’un minimum vieillesse universaliste. En effet les droits acquis par l’accumulation de points, ou les sommes capitalisées étaient, au bout de 30 ans de cotisation, devenus significatifs.

 

Le retour du risque social.

C’est à partir de la crise de la société industrielle et fordiste, donc à partir des années 80, que le risque social revient au premier plan. En France, les mécanismes mis en place pour indemniser les chômeurs étaient fondés sur le principe de l’assurance. Devant le chômage de masse et surtout de longue durée, le système se révèle incapable d’assurer sur le long terme des revenus de remplacement décents, faute de pouvoir augmenter les cotisations. Les ouvriers qui perdent leur emploi dans les années 80 ne travailleront pour la plupart plus jamais. Les mécanismes les plus ingénieux sont inventés, distendant jusqu’à la limite de la rupture le système des retraites, avec par exemple des pré retraites accordées à 52 ans dans la sidérurgie. La France, toujours à la pointe de la créativité  rhétorique, mène donc des politiques d’assistance en leur donnant une nouvelle appellation aux connotations plus républicaines, la solidarité. En I988, le gouvernement socialiste confie à un ecclésiastique, dirigeant une organisation charitable, ATD, le père Wresinski, la rédaction d’un rapport sur la grande pauvreté[5]. Ceci débouche sur l’adoption du RMI, sorte de compromis politique entre les partisans d’un revenu universel non lié au travail, et ceux du workfare américain, dans lequel les allocations sont conditionnées par l’acceptation d’un travail d’intérêt général. La boucle est bouclée, et le RMI met un terme à la période où le travail  débouchait non seulement sur un salaire, mais aussi sur  une garantie de revenu en cas de perte d’emploi non intentionnelle. Les nouvelles figures de la charité et du bon coeur, Abbé Pierre, Coluche, le père Wresinsky deviennent les héros de la lutte contre le risque. Les pratiques charitables de l’époque pré-fordiste reviennent donc à l’ordre du jour. Elles  complètent des prestations universalistes modestes et, de facto, sans contrepartie.

A partir de 1988, c’est une couverture minimale et universelle qui répond au risque social en France[6]. En Grande Bretagne, il en est à peu près de même, mais avec un discours beaucoup plus agressif. En bonne logique néo libérale, le risque doit être accepté. Les néo libéraux prennent le pouvoir politique en Grande-Bretagne en 1979 et aux Etats-Unis en 1980, et en viennent à dominer le champ des débats et des politiques  économiques dans le monde entier dans les années 1980. La présence sur le marché, qu’il s’agisse du marché du travail pour les hommes ou du marché des biens et services pour les entreprises, implique deux choses. La première est la possibilité de la réussite, qui ne doit pas être ternie par une fiscalité indûment élevée, ou, ce qui est pire, redistributive. La deuxième est la menace de l’échec. Les entreprises qui ont failli n’ont droit à aucune aide de l’Etat, même si cela doit entrainer la disparition de secteurs industriels entiers. Il en est de même des individus, qui ne doivent tenir leurs revenus que de leur industrie. Le risque est donc un élément positif, car il est fortement incitatif. On assiste donc à une dénonciation virulente des politiques sociales menées depuis la guerre, destinées précisément à réduire les risques, d’abord de la part de Keith Joseph, puis de Thatcher elle-même. Le Welfare a eu un effet « désincitatif »  en émoussant l’aiguillon de la pauvreté. Aussi la pression mise sur les demandeurs d’emplois sera-t-elle intensifiée tout au long de la décennie. Le principe dominant les règles de calcul des allocations reste celui de la Nouvelle Loi sur les Pauvres de 1834, dit de « Less eligibility » : un revenu de remplacement doit obligatoirement être nettement inférieur à  un salaire, afin d’inciter à chômeurs accepter un emploi au tarif offert par le marché du travail, quel qu’il soit. Il n’existait pas de salaire minimum avant 1998.[7]

 

Le goût du risque.

Au-delà des chômeurs, le principe même de la sécurité de l’emploi est, dans le modèle anglo-saxon, mis en cause dans les années 1980. L’emploi à vie est présenté comme problématique économiquement, dans un monde voué au mouvement perpétuel, et même comme nocif pour les individus[8]. Une nouvelle culture va peu à peu être imposée, qui fait de l’acceptation du risque une valeur cardinale. Ceci ne peut être compris qu’en prenant en compte deux facteurs. D’une part la domination du champ politique et social par les néo libéraux et l’affaiblissement à la fois de la gauche et du mouvement syndical dans son ensemble a permis aux Thatchérien de balayer la culture socialiste et de faire litière des valeurs issues des lutte du passé.[9] La grève des mineurs de 1984-1985 illustre parfaitement la dureté de cet affrontement, mené comme une campagne militaire. D’autre part, l’évolution technologique a été extrêmement rapide, grâce à l’informatique, et la Grande Bretagne a basculé dans une société de services reléguant l’industrie à un rôle marginal. La physionomie du  nouveau mode de production a donc une forte composante technologique. Le raccourcissement de la durée de vie des entreprises de service, qui ne nécessitent pas de lourds appareillages industriels, l’accélération des délais et le travail à flux tendu (« zéro stock, zéro retard, zéro défaut »), le souci de s’adapter à la demande des clients et à l’apparition de nouveaux produits, dans un monde où la capacité des ordinateurs double tous les 18 mois, produisent peu à peu une culture de la flexibilité, même dans les secteurs où elle est totalement superflue. La capacité de vivre le risque dans la joie devient un des éléments clés de l’employabilité, terme valise qui regroupe à la fois des compétences techniques et des vertus sociales : capacité à s’adapter à un environnement de travail parfois stressant, apparence physique et vestimentaire adaptées à l’emploi et … acceptation du risque économique, conduisant éventuellement à une modulation des revenus où à une perte d’emploi.

En Europe du nord, c’est autour de la question de l’employabilité, et de la gestion du risque, que se situe le débat entre sociaux-démocrates, encore partiellement liés au monde syndical et plus généralement au monde du salariat, et néo libéraux. En effet, si tous partagent l’enthousiasme en faveur de la flexibilité, deux divergences apparaissent. La première porte sur le contenu de l’employabilité. Les pays scandinaves, qui sont l’avant-garde de la social-démocratie, insistent sur le caractère crucial des compétences techniques, et donc de la formation pour adultes, alors que les néo libéraux conservateurs, tournées vers les USA, considèrent que cet aspect est secondaire par rapport aux caractéristiques psychologiques du chômeur « activement en recherche d’emploi »[10] En second lieu, les sociaux-démocrates proposent de combiner flexibilité et sécurité, et donc de réduire les risques. Cela prend le nom de flexicurité. En pratique, les pays nordiques combinent un marché du travail offrant peu d’obstacles aux licenciements, et donc très flexible, et un welfare state où les revenus de remplacement sont généreux, et l’aide aux chômeurs efficace, individualisée et rigoureuse.[11] La flexibilité est acceptée non pas seulement parce qu’elle permet aux entreprises du pays de prospérer et de tenir leur rang face à la concurrence, mais parce qu’elle ne conduit ni à une dégradation des conditions de vie des travailleurs ni à une déqualification, bien au contraire. Les compétences acquises dans ce cadre permettent de faire évoluer les carrières, et facilitent la flexibilité interne, au sein d’une même entreprise. La notion de carrière, interdite aux ouvriers dans les pays où la barrière entre encadrement et exécution est difficile à franchir, permet donc, dans le meilleur des cas, de faire du risque un tremplin. Ce conte de fées nordique a un  certain rapport avec la réalité dans ces pays, mais est surtout important, dans les grands pays européens, en tant que mythe mobilisateur. L’ « activation du marché du travail » a été présentée comme un rempart contre le risque, ou plutôt comme la seule stratégie limitant le risque de déqualification.

L’utilisation rhétorique de cette nouvelle stratégie anti risque illustre une fois de plus le danger des importations de politiques publiques. Ce qui est adapté dans un petit pays ayant quelques dizaines de milliers de chômeurs,  un consensus national sur l’importance de la cohésion, le bienfondé de la fiscalité, et le fait que la fraude est inacceptable aura une autre signification dans un autre contexte. Il est clair que les stratégies faisant de la requalification des chômeurs le meilleur rempart contre le risque social nécessitent des moyens humains – les formateurs- institutionnels – les organismes de formation et de gestion des stages- et financiers. Il est également nécessaire que les pilotes du programme aient une vision des emplois d’’avenir, et donc anticipent l’évolution économique et sociale du pays, ce qui n’est pas une mince gageure, que connaissent bien les gestionnaires de tout enseignement technique.  Au Danemark, pionnier en la matière, le consensus s’est fissuré temporairement autour de la question de l’immigration dont les effectifs, aux yeux de l’extrême droite, parvenue aux pieds des  marches du pouvoir, mettaient en cause le bien fondé même de la notion de cohésion, et entrainaient une rupture du contrat moral alliant contribuables et allocataires. Pourquoi payer des impôts pour de nouveaux arrivants difficiles à  intégrer sur le marché du travail, et qui ne partagent pas nécessairement toutes les valeurs démocratiques ? Néanmoins, c’est dans les pays scandinaves que la flexicurité a connu un début d’application. 

La Grande-Bretagne du New Labour a toujours considéré le modèle nordique comme son horizon, par opposition à un modèle américain chanté par les conservateurs.[12] C’est peu de dire que le continent européen est souvent perçu comme arriéré socialement. Quand Tony Blair parvient au pouvoir en 1997, c’est pour treize ans. Un des domaines dans lesquels il investira le plus est sans contexte l’éducation, et, au-delà de la formation initiale classique, la formation des chômeurs.[13] Les évaluations de la politique de retour à l’emploi sont, avec le recul, mitigées, ce qui ne veut pas dire négatives, mais il est incontestable que des moyens humains et financiers considérables ont été mobilisés par le New Labour pour réduire le risque social. [14]Le programme New Deal for Jobs, maintes fois décrit sera mis en place interdisant par exemple aux jeunes de 25 ans de toucher « passivement «  une allocation chômage, mais leur offrant des formations, des emplois aidés en entreprise, des emplois dans le secteur environnemental ou associatif. Ce sont donc certaines catégories qui furent ciblées : jeunes, mères célibataires – identifiées comme un groupe à risque en GB du fait de leur taux de chômage, et souvent de leur âge tendre- , chômeurs de plus de 55 ans, ce qui n’est pas sans rappeler les débuts de la politique sociale. Devant l’ampleur des problèmes, ce sont certaines catégories qui sont ciblées et qui se voient protégées des risques. Ceci est d’autant plus instructif que ces politiques se déroulaient dans les années 2000,  caractérisées en GB par une forte croissance et  un taux de chômage aux alentours de 3%, c’est-à-dire très faible. Le contexte européen, et notamment français, dans les années suivant la crise de 2008, est évidemment immensément moins favorable, tant en termes de disponibilité de financements publics que d’opportunités d’emploi, et de taux de chômage. Aussi, la fonction réelle des discours tenus dans le contexte d’une France en crise sociale et économique profonde sur le risque social, et l’intérêt des politiques d’activation du marché du travail est-elle tout à fait spécifique. Il est totalement impossible de mener une telle politique en direction de la grande majorité des chômeurs. Les discours sur l’activation du marché du travail ont donc pour seule fonction non pas de diminuer les risques mais de culpabiliser les chômeurs et leur laisser assumer seuls, avec une allocation réduite, affronter le risque social. C’est en effet au simple workfare américain que peut aboutir, dans le contexte du chômage de masse et de diète budgétaire, le discours sur l’activation. Certes des contreparties sont demandées aux chômeurs en échange de leur allocation, mais celle-ci n’ a pas pour fonction de les prémunir des risques. Les travaux obligatoires imposés aux chômeurs n’ont aucun caractère formateur, n’augmentent nullement leurs chances de retrouver un emploi. Nous pouvons même aboutir à une situation où certains chômeurs préfèrent abandonner la perspective d ‘une aide, face aux risques, plutôt que de devoir accepter un travail obligatoire, et se révèlent donc réfractaires.

Le risque écologique.

Parmi les innovations introduites par la social démocratie, en particulier la fraction qui a été, à partir des années 80, graduellement influencée par l’écologie politique, on peut noter une nouvelle sensibilité aux risques écologiques. En effet, alors même que les risques sociaux, qui avaient fortement diminué jusqu’aux années 70, reprenaient force et vigueur grâce au néo libéralisme, un certain nombre de catastrophes médiatisées, et de rapports alarmants mettaient au premier plan le risque écologique. C’est notamment Anthony Giddens, le principal théoricien du New Labour, qui a tiré des conséquences politiques de cela[15]. Le problème posé est bien sûr de nature prudentielle. En effet, les assurances considèrent les « acts of God » comme des clauses d’exemption de toute couverture, au même titre que les guerres. Les grandes catastrophes, naufrages dus à des tempêtes mais aux conséquences dramatiques, les évolutions dues au réchauffement de la planète sont parfois assimilées à des phénomènes naturels, même s’ils sont la conséquence d’un développement économique mal planifié et incontrôlé. Le montant des destructions provoquées par la montée du niveau de la mer, ou, potentiellement, par un grave accident nucléaire dépasse dans tous les cas de figure les moyens des compagnies d’assurance, et nécessiterait une mobilisation exceptionnelle  des Etats. La prévention ou le traitement du risque écologique ne peut donc pas être résolu par les moyens habituels, mais devient une question directement politique. L’écologie politique nécessite donc l’apport d’une dimension universelle, globale –Think Globally, Act Locally est l’injonction fétiche des écologistes-, qui permet à Giddens et à tous ceux qui abordent ces questions d’accéder à une hauteur de vue, et à une vision synthétique bienvenue. Cet apport idéologique au socialisme comblait un peu la perte subie avec la fin de la société industrielle, le déclin numérique de la classe ouvrière et la perte de l’espoir historique que le messianisme marxiste avait représenté pour beaucoup. La volonté de synthèse et d’universalisme, concrétisée  dans les courants les plus radicaux par l’internationalisme et l’anticolonialisme, trouve dans l’ écologie politique une nouvelle justification. Ceci sera embrassé avec d’autant plus d’enthousiasme dans les années 90 que le discours travailliste souffre d’un déficit d’idéalisme, et qu’il doit trouver un objectif de remplacement, après l’abandon de la perspective de l’égalité sociale. La lutte contre les risques planétaires deviendra donc rapidement un des leitmotifs de Tony Blair, ce qui conduira à deux engagements. Le premier concerne le réchauffement climatique. La Grande Bretagne, du fait de la délocalisation de sa production industrielle dans les pays du sud, est devenue immensément moins polluée qu’elle n’était dans les années 50, où le célèbre smog, combinaison du brouillard et des particules de carbone dues à l’utilisation du charbon,   faisait chaque hiver des centaines de victimes. Elle s’est fait le champion du protocole de Kyoto en 1997,et après son départ du 10 Downing Street, Blair a consacré de très nombreuses conférences à ce thème. Par ailleurs, l’intervention de la GB en Irak, un des sujets les plus controversés de la période, a été présentée, à tort ou à raison, comme essentiellement motivée par une stratégie de gestion des risques. L’existence d’armes de destruction massive chimiques ou biologiques était réputée faire peser un risque important sur l’humanité, et l’intervention a été justifiée par la nécessité d’éliminer cette menace. C’est encore sous cette forme que la question est présentée par Tony Blair dans ses mémoires.

La similitude entre un risque chimique industriel et un risque chimique militaire a été mise en exergue. Il en est de même de l’attentat du 11 septembre. Au-delà de la volonté criminelle de ses auteurs, c’est le gigantisme des tours et des avions, produit de la rationalité moderne, qui donne à l’attentat sa démesure. On trouvera ici un écho des interrogations de Bertrand Russell, figure tutélaire de la gauche britannique, et père du mouvement anti nucléaire dans son œuvre de 1953   « The Impact of Science on Society ».[16]

Pour des raisons tenant à la vie politique et intellectuelle, et à la constitution française, l’intégration des problématiques écologiques prend dans ce pays un autre chemin qu’en GB. L’écologie politique se construit en dehors des grands appareils, et ne trouve d’expression qu’à travers des courants autonomes qui peinent à se faire entendre en dehors des scrutins ayant une part de proportionnelle, ou dans des courants se situant à la gauche de la social-démocratie. La thématique des risques naturels est certes abordée par les gouvernants, comme à l’occasion du Grenelle de l’environnement, dont les conclusions ne résistent pas aux impératifs électoraux et au lobbying des milieux agricoles. La question nucléaire ressurgit à la suite de l’accident de Fukushima, mais pose à la France un problème extrêmement difficile à résoudre, du fait de la proportion d’énergie nucléaire dans la production  nationale. Le débat politique sur ces questions est très en deçà des enjeux, au moins jusqu’en 2012. 

 

Le « risque famille ».

 

Le fait que la famille soit considérée comme un risque au même titre que la maladie, la grêle ou les accidents du travail est un sujet inépuisable de plaisanterie chez les spécialistes français de politique sociale, en particulier où dans un monde moderne où la constitution d’une famille fait souvent l’objet d’une délibération et d’une décision consciente. C’est plutôt la crise d’une  famille qui  a un effet déstabilisateur pour les individus, à la fois sur le plan psychologique et financier. Mais ceci n’est qu’un aspect du problème. La famille, et la démographie connaissent, dans les deux pays, un traitement profondément différent. La politique de la famille est intiment liée à la vision qu’ont les gouvernants de la gestion des populations. Pour la France des années 1870, le risque principal est de voir la population française, amputée de l’Alsace et de la Lorraine, peiner à s’étoffer, et ne jamais  parvenir à se hisser au niveau de l’Allemagne ou de l’Angleterre. Il est exact que la démographie française, au XIX^ème siècle, est peu dynamique, surtout par comparaison avec l’Angleterre. Dans ce pays, en revanche, le problème est inverse. Les gouvernants et une bonne partie des milieux intellectuels adhérent aux conceptions de Malthus et considèrent l’augmentation de la population ouvrière comme un vrai risque. Selon la formule de Malthus, en effet, la population si on n’y prend garde, augmente de façon arithmétique, et les ressources de façon géométrique, ce qui conduit mécaniquement à la pauvreté et à des troubles sociaux. La France veut augmenter sa population, la GB la contenir. La France va se doter d’un arsenal de politiques publiques, motivées à la fois par des considérations natalistes et nationalistes, et par l’engagement très fort de l’Eglise catholique, et des milieux qu’elle influence fortement, comme le patronat. Pour ces derniers, il y a un vrai enjeu politique et idéologique à construire une identité  féminine entièrement tournée vers la procréation, et à encourager les hommes à « faire leur devoir national », en assistant généreusement la famille. Allocations familiales, aides directes fournies par les municipalités, plus tard quotient familial feront de la France un des pays européens où la famille est la plus aidée. L’importance idéologique de cette politique est connue, et est reflétée dans le slogan « travail, famille, patrie » du régime pétainiste. La contraception et l’avortement sont considérés comme des crimes contre la nation, et sous le régime de Vichy, une personne reconnue coupable d’avoir pratiqué un avortement sera guillotinée. Néanmoins, sur le plan social, cette politique d’origine nationaliste et cléricale va être un levier puissant pour faire échapper  les familles, en particulier nombreuses, au risque de la pauvreté , et va bénéficier d’un consensus national jusqu’au début du XXI^ème siècle. En pratique, alors qu’en GB les familles nombreuses ne bénéficient d’aucune aura particulière, et reçoivent des allocations modiques, ce qui donne naissance à un lobby « Child Poverty Action Group », en France, au contraire, les familles nombreuses pauvres sont très rarement stigmatisées et échappent à la fois à la pauvreté et à l’accusation d’assistanat. Les allocations familiales françaises sont défendues par les courants les plus conservateurs de culture cléricale et nationaliste, au nom de la protection de la famille. Les propositions de fiscaliser les allocations familiales ou de limiter les avantages du quotient familial pour les contribuables aisés se heurtent en France  à de farouches résistances.

En Grande Bretagne, au contraire, le risque famille doit être assumé … par les familles. Au XIX^ème siècle, l’Empire a fonctionné comme une soupape de sécurité, et a absorbé le surplus de population, parfois envoyé au-delà des océans de façon  expéditive. Des travaux récents ont rappelé l’envoi forcé d’enfants orphelins au Canada, où ils devaient travailler au service des agriculteurs installés sur place, dans des conditions extrêmement dures. Contrairement à la France, la GB n’a jamais criminalisé de façon particulièrement sévère contraception et même avortement, qui avaient l’avantage de limiter la population et donc les risques. Beveridge n’identifie pas la famille parmi les « cinq géants », et la question de l’enfance sera donc traitée essentiellement sur le registre de la lutte contre la pauvreté. Notons que, même si « male breadwinner model » honni du féminisme est retenu symboliquement, en fait, les femmes, mariées ou non, bénéficient d’une protection en tant que citoyennes, et non en tant qu’épouses, ce qui n’est pas le cas dans les systèmes corporatistes. De même, la fiscalité n’est pas fondée sur la notion de quotient familial et les individus sont imposés séparément. L’indépendance des femmes sera donc une réalité en GB plus tôt qu’en France.  En ce qui concerne le risque social pour les familles, elles ne bénéficient pas de soutien particulier, si bien que dès les années 60, un lobby se crée, après la publication d’une brochure dénonçant la politique des travaillistes et intitulée « The Poor Are Getting Poorer Under Labour », ce qui privait les travaillistes de l’aura de défenseurs du welfare state[17]. Ce lobby, le Child Poverty Action Group, existe toujours, et a influencé les termes du débat, sans toutefois avoir un énorme impact en termes concrets. Les conservateurs, quant à eux, ce sont présentés comme des défenseurs de la famille traditionnelle, expliquant que le risque social découlait souvent de comportements à risques, et donc de la culture des pauvres. Ce faisant, ils ont à partir des années 70, et jusqu’aux gouvernements Major de 1990 à 1997, tenu un discours normatif. Le manque d’implication  des pères de la communauté noire dans leurs familles était, aux Etats unis, mise en exergue par des auteurs comme Charles Murray ou Lawrence Mead. En Grande Bretagne, c’est la figure de la mère célibataire blanche, mineure, chômeuse et locataire d’un HLM qui illustre, aux yeux des néo libéraux, la figure du « scrounger », l’assisté qui est victime de sa paresse et d’un système qui l’encourage à attendre une allocation plutôt que de travailler et d’ajuster son comportement. [18]Nous sommes dans le mythe, car la réalité sociologique a un rapport indirect avec ce discours : le nombre de personnes concernées était en effet bien inférieur à ce que la fréquence de cette mise en cause ne le laisserait penser.

Les politiques menées au cours des premières années du siècle par les travaillistes en GB, une période de relative prospérité, étaient centrées sur l’emploi des femmes. L’arrivée de femmes plus nombreuses sur le marché du travail était souhaitée, pour plusieurs raisons. L’emploi, en premier lieu était perçu comme le meilleur rempart contre le risque social. En second lieu, l’avènement de la société de service supprime toutes les justifications à l’exclusion des femmes fondées sur la pénibilité physique, la lourdeur des poids ou la promiscuité dans la pénombre des galeries de mine. En troisième lieu, le New Labour souhaitait apparaitre comme fidèle au modèle scandinave, et donc comme « woman friendly », favorable aux femmes. En quatrième lieu, le décompte du nombre de gens en position d’activité, positif,  a remplacé dans la rhétorique officielle le décompte, négatif, des chômeurs. Une société peut se permettre d’indemniser des chômeurs si le nombre global de travailleurs crée assez de prospérité. Enfin, l’absence de structures publiques  d’accueil de la petite enfance et en particulier d’écoles maternelles avant l’âge de 5 ans empêchait nombre de femmes dans la force de l’âge, compétentes et qualifiées,  de travailler à un moment de leur existence où elle sont les plus productives.  Aussi, une active politique de scolarisation des jeunes enfants fut elle poursuivie. L’arrivée de la crise a été suivie de peu par celle des conservateurs au pouvoir. La combinaison de ces deux facteurs a conduit à l’annonce de réductions  sensibles dans les dépenses sociales, réduites à leur minimum incompressible.

 

 

Face aux risques sociaux, les deux pays se trouvent dans des situations à la fois comparables et profondément différentes. Le caractère protecteur du système français est marqué : il doit son nom – la protection sociale-  à cette fonction, et protège les citoyens des aléas de la vie économique. Il est donc conçu en réaction à un certain nombre de risques. Le système britannique se veut plus « pro actif » selon le vocable journalistique contemporain. Il prétend anticiper sur l’évolution des problèmes et réduire les risques avant qu’ils ne prennent des proportions importantes. C’est du moins la fonction du discours sur les risques qui n’empêche pas dans les années 80, la présence de 12 millions de pauvres, et le retour du phénomène aujourd’hui. Néanmoins, il est exact de dire que le système britannique entend modifier le comportement des individus en amont. Ce « social engineering » a des effets très différents selon les époques.  Dans les deux pays, toutefois, c’est l’état de la régulation sociale et des rapports sociaux qui détermine la réalité des politiques, quelles que soient les différences institutionnelles[19].

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Chapter III. Britain changes course : 1957- 1963. 

 

The Commonwealth

The Special Relationship

Britain’s loss of self confidence

The political process

Negotiations and French veto.

 

- The Commonwealth

The Commonwealth became less important from Britain, both in economic and political terms.

 

In economic terms, British exports to the Commonwealth, which represented 45% of the total in 1945, only accounted for 25% of British exports by 1960. Meanwhile, exports to continental Europe increased fast. Pressure from the most dynamic sectors of British industry, represented by the Federation of British Industry (later to become the Confederation of British Industry, the British equivalent of the French MEDEF), was exerted on the government , in order to facilitate access to European markets.  British exports to the Commonwealth suffered from serious competition from countries whose currency was not as highly priced as the Pound, and which offered industrial products of equal quality. 

 

In political terms, British military protection could no longer match that of the United States. By the late 1950’s, the Commonwealth, which originally included mostly states peopled and governed by English speaking, white protestants (the former “Dominions”, which  were granted home rule, and then independence, at an early stage: Canada, Australia, New Zealand) , was now dominated by a majority of black states, some of which were not 100% Christian, and some were influenced  by Socialists. Nigeria, the Sierra Leone, Ghana (former Gold Coast), Jamaica did not necessarily share the strategic concerns of Britain, and were more incensed by the situation in South Africa than by Soviet pressure on Europe. In South Africa, a member of the Commonwealth, the white minority exerted a dictatorship over the black majority, which lived in dire poverty in spite of the country’s wealth. The white regime  operated a system based on official segregation called apartheid. The South African whites were themselves divided between the Dutch speaking Boers, who were the majority, and the English speaking section, which was slightly less committed to apartheid.

Feelings within the Commonwealth were running high on this question. It seemed that, in other African countries, white minorities were trying to obtain independence from the mother country (Britain), only to establish racist regimes which would go on depriving Africans of their civil, political and social rights , thus perpetuating colonial  rule. This was certainly attempted in Rhodesia (North of South Africa, a country now called Zimbabwe) and, earlier, in Kenya. Britain was very uneasy about this. In its former colonies, it opposed unambiguously such attempts by white minorities, even when they were English speaking . However, in South Africa, the situation was more complex. On the one hand, black states felt very strongly about it and wanted the Commonwealth to condemn, and, possibly, take action against the racist South African regime. On the other hand, Britain had large investments in South Africa, a world  class  producer of diamonds, gems, and gold. British banks were heavily involved. A British condemnation of South Africa would not have much effect, and would eventually isolate the English speaking population among the South African whites.  Britain therefore procrastinated, tried to buy time and to prevent a diplomatic crisis. The black Commonwealth states went ahead regardless, and a motion condemning South Africa was voted by the Commonwealth in 1960, in spite of British opposition. This proved that Britain no longer controlled the organization, and encouraged the UK to reorient its policy. It would go on decolonising its former “empire”, but could certainly not rely on the Commonwealth for support. In I961, South Africa left the Commonwealth. Britain had, at one go,  lost the trust of black members, and  part of its influence in  South Africa.

 

-The Special Relationship

 

Relationships with the US deteriorated when the UK refused to join the European Defence Community, thus scuppering the whole project. They reached crisis point in 1956, during the Suez affair.

 

    Egypt, a former protectorate,  had been under British influence since the beginning of the XXth century, when, as part of the Entente Cordiale deal,  it was agreed by Britain and France that French influence would be paramount in Morocco,  and British influence would be in Egypt. Egypt, in 1956, was dominated by a nationalist officer, Colonel  Nasser, who was also a leader of the Non Aligned Movement, a movement by third world countries who refused both Soviet and Western domination, and tried to steer an independent course. This movement, in which India, another former British colony, led by Nehru, was also involved,  was not approved by Britain. Nasser had ambitious plans in order to develop his country’s economy, and wanted to build a dam on the Nile river, in order to generate electricity. He attempted to borrow funds to that effect from British banks, but the deal was blocked by the British government. Nasser retaliated, and decided to nationalize  the Suez Canal, a strategic link between the Mediterranean and the Red Sea, built by the French, and operated by an Anglo French  consortium. France too  had  a grudge against Nasser, who provided political and military support for the Algerian nationalist Front de Libération Nationale, who had just started their military campaign against France in Algeria (in November  1954).  The nationalization of the Suez Canal was considered as illegal. An agreement was struck between Britain, France and Israel, and the three countries intervened militarily in Egypt. From a purely military point of view the operation was a great success, paratroopers seized Port Said without difficulty. Politically, however, it was quite disastrous. The USA had not been warned, or informed, and condemned the Anglo French operation. The USA had a double objective: making it impossible for  European countries to pursue an independent policy in the region on the one hand, and on the other hand persuading Arabs in general and Egyptians in particular that the US would offer them protection in any case, and that there was no need to turn to their great rival , the USSR, for assistance.  Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, US policy has naturally changed, and direct military intervention in the Middle East  is no longer taboo.

 

In order to force the UK to withdraw, the US did not refrain from exerting direct financial pressure, selling Pounds on world markets, and withdrawing some of their assets from  Britain. This was less than friendly. The British Prime Minister, Anthony Eden,  had to resign. American friendship could no longer be taken for granted.

 

    Besides, the arms race between the US and the USSR dwarfed the British nuclear arsenal. Britain was certainly the only European power with nuclear capability between 1952 (when the first British bomb was tested in Australia) and 1960 (when the first French bomb was tested in Algeria), but , in terms of megatons, it was small compared to the two superpowers. British advice to the US  was no longer taken seriously, and was no more than a mild irritant. The US negotiated directly with the USSR, when necessary, for example during the Cuba crisis, and no longer included Britain in strategic decisions.

 

 In the eyes of the US, Germany was more important than Britain, especially in 1960. Germany had to be reassured, and Kennedy had to say “Ich Bin Ein Berliner” when the blockade of Berlin was started  by the GDR (German Democratic Republic, i.e. East Germany). This trend lasted throughout the 1960’s. President L.B. Johnson never  even bothered to visit the UK.

 

The US remained important, but as a patron rather than a partner. When it appeared that Britain could not mobilize on its own  the technology necessary to produce a missile with which it could deliver its nuclear bombs, it opened negotiations with the US to buy one. This spelled the end of British  sovereignty. The US agreed to sell them the Polaris missile system, which was fitted on British submarines throughout the I960’s and I970’s, in return for a base at Holy Loch in Scotland. The missiles had to be permanently serviced, and improved by US experts . In the context of the arms race, missiles could not just be bought “off the shelf”  like a shot gun, they had to be regularly updated by American staff to avoid detection and obsolescence. By committing itself to the deployment of US weaponry, the British government was abandoning the prospect of an independent deterrent – just when France was trying to create one. The agreement with the US was signed at Nassau (Bahamas) in 1963 .

 

Britain’s loss of self confidence.

 

In the late1950’s, the political atmosphere changed in Britain. The Government went to the polls, in 1957, with an incredibly optimistic slogan (“You’ve Never Had It So Good” i.e. : You have never been so rich), but this spirit soon vanished, in the wake of Suez, and of economic difficulties.  The option which journalists had called GITA in the past (“Going It Alone”), i.e. splendid isolation, was no longer open.

 

 The country suffered from “stop go” policies, which became known as “the British disease”. This could be described as  a perverted way  of implementing Keynes’s ideas. Keynes’s views were predicated on the notion that the first duty of government was to fight or prevent unemployment. The way to do this was through the stimulation of demand, which could be effected through the reduction of taxes, the commandeering of public works, and, first and foremost, by making sure interest rates should remain as low as possible.  This was a very attractive policy, which had considerable advantages for  the working class, for employers and for the state. The working class enjoyed a low rate of unemployment,  high wages  and access to consumption. Employers benefited from industrial peace, an increased output and  high profits. Government reaped the benefits of  social stability, general prosperity and significant tax returns on incomes and consumption.  This policy, in the late 40’s and 50’s, combined with the new mode of production adopted by the developed capitalist world since the 1930’s: the productivity gains made possible by technological progress (e.g. electrification) combined with a permanent rationalization of the work process, enabled industry  to increase wages, offer vast quantities of consumer goods  at an accessible cost, and finance the development of public services, such as health care and education. The system was a dynamic one, at the core of which was the notion of economic growth. Productivity, wages, profits were improving all the time. Hence the slogan “You’ve Never Had It So Good”. The period from 1945 to 1975 was called by the French economist Jean Fourastié “Les trente glorieuses”.  The whole fordist system collapsed in the 1970’s.

 

The problem about the British economy of the 1950’s was that the popular Keynesian policies of demand stimulation (called “go”)  led the British population to purchase not only British goods, but also goods produced abroad, leading to a rapid increase in the balance of payment deficits. Import controls (i.e. protectionism) could have been a solution, but where in contradiction with British liberal culture, and with the spirit of the times. Economic planning, and the development of those sectors where consumer demand was high, but British industry was not competitive enough, could also have been envisaged … if only Britain was not Britain. Britain is neither France nor Japan, where the idea that the government can legitimately intervene in the economy, identify technological and commercial targets, mobilize capital and appoint top level, well trained  managers is common place. There is no British equivalent of Colbertisme. Britain is a truly liberal, capitalist country, where the market dominates the economy and, some would say, the whole of society.

 

Besides, for a country like Britain, the trade deficit was a more serious problem than it would be for other nations, such as the USA, which have had a massive one for decades. Since the beginning of the XXth century, Britain had had a trade deficit in the fields of agriculture, but also industry. This was only compensated by the “invisibles”, i.e. the considerable amounts generated by the banking sector, insurance companies and the Stock Exchange. Britain attracted capital from all over the world ,and relied on this in order to finance its agricultural and industrial imports. It was dependent on the reputation of the City (where all the financial institutions are located) for its sheer survival , and the preservation of its living standards. What was at stake  was not just a question of prestige.

 

The reliability of the City depended to a large extent on the reputation of the Pound, since  any move affecting the value of the British currency would have incited foreigners to withdraw their assets from London and transfer them to the US, Switzerland, or some other financial centre. Paris , at the time, was not a significant centre, from the point of view of international banking or stock markets.

 

The trade deficit, if it increased permanently, could have affected international confidence in the Pound, and its value, thus plunging the City into a downward spiral, and, it was feared,  bringing about a terminal crisis for the British economy. Limiting the trade deficit was therefore deemed essential by the British governments of the 1950’s, and the only remedy they found was to reduce  the demand for  foreign goods, by reducing consumption. They therefore reversed, repeatedly, the Keynesian policies. They increased interest rates and taxes, stopped public expenditure. This was called a “stop” type of policy. The effect was immediate. Consumption stopped in its tracks, and the trade deficit was reduced overnight. However, the consequences for British society and British industry were also disastrous, since British producers were not selling any of their goods either. After a few months of “stop”, governments had to reverse their policies again, and start stimulating the economy … until the deficit increased again. Those contradictory policies lasted from the mid 1950’s to the early 1970’s, and clearly gave the impression governments had lost their grip over the economy.

 

Besides, from a political point of view, Britain was also less sure of itself. A significant section of public opinion (probably around 30%) was clearly hostile to the nuclear defence policy adopted by the government, which it found immoral, since strategic nuclear weapons  targeted civilian populations, inefficient, since it could never be used for fear of annihilation of the British population, and politically objectionable, since it tied the UK to the USA irrevocably. In a sense, the anti-nuclear movement can be considered as a political gesture rejecting US and Soviet control over Europe.  The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament , including religious leaders and trade unionists, mobilized vast numbers of young people and intellectuals and organized large demonstrations. Even the role of Britain in the Second World War was criticized, and the systematic bombing of some German cities, such as Dresden,  – as opposed to strategic  objectives- , was judged immoral and useless from a military point of view.

 

 

-The political process.

 

The Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan, who succeeded Anthony Eden after Suez, was in a fairly strong position in political terms. He was personally convinced by his experts  that Britain should try and join the Common Market before it was too late – as indeed it was. The arguments were summed up by Edward Heath, who shared this idea, and said, in 1961: “ We now see, opposite to us on the mainland of Europe a large group comparable in size to the USA and the Soviet Union, and, as its economic power increases, so will its political influence”. The economic arguments were very real. The Common Market was succeeding. The growth rates of Germany and France was now much higher than Britain’s, tariffs had already been cut by 30%, American investment was flowing into continental Europe. But, as one can see from Heath’s quote, the political argument was also very much present.  Britain would suffer greatly from the emergence of a political giant on its doorstep, if it could not exert any influence over it. The argument was negative, and did not stem from any enthusiasm for the pooling of sovereignties, but was nevertheless very real. There is some evidence British policy has not changed much since that time.

 

         The chief ideological argument was perfectly in keeping with the all pervading British liberal philosophy: joining Europe would force Britain to face competition, and to become more efficient. This would stimulate British  industry. The argument sounded as if it was borrowed from Adam Smith.

 

From the point of view of political science, the process which led Britain to completely reverse its policy within a very short period is a textbook case which illustrated perfectly the high degree of centralization of power in the UK. The whole of the nation, including leading politicians, the press, Members of Parliament,  trade union leaders was culturally  hostile to integration. Therefore,  leading Britain to apply for membership in I961 was no mean feat.  The key character was the Prime Minister. Once convinced of the need to apply, he reshuffled his Cabinet, in July 1960, to include more pro Europeans (Duncan Sandys, Christopher Soames, Edward Heath). He then announced his decision to apply publicly, in July 1961, thus forcing his party to tow the line and accept his decision: a vote against him would have been a vote of censure for the government and brought it down. A major opponent within the Conservative party was a rather old fashioned Viscount Hinchingbrooke MP, who said, typically: “Do we ally ourselves with our history and all that we have done to make and maintain this enormous Commonwealth … or do we put obstacles in its progress at the behest of the USA, for the sake of a purely commercial and ideological connection with a corner of Europe ?” . Clearly, by 1961, the “enormous Commonwealth” was no longer an alternative to the Common Market, and the connection to the USA already a very strong one.

 

The Liberals, who had always been pro Europeans, supported Macmillan, and the Labour leadership, who was expecting to win the next elections, (and who did win in 1964) did not want the issue to divide its own ranks. They did not oppose Macmillan with a lot of energy. The more left wing unions, such as the miners , were clearly hostile, since they hoped that a sovereign labour government would be as radical as Attlee’s had been in the post war context, and introduce more democratic reforms. In practice, the Labour governments of the I960’s and 1970’s proved much less radical , as their margin for economic and social reforms proved very narrow. This helped convince unions, in the 1980’s, that membership of Europe would make no  difference either way in terms of  home policies and reforms. It would neither facilitate them nor hinder them.

 

The conservative press followed Macmillan, with a few exceptions, and became favourable to entry.

 

         Employers were less divided than they used to be. The most dynamic and forward looking section, the Federation of British Industry,  including large companies, was very favourable, and helped convince government experts and the Prime Minister himself. Small provincial firms, who made up the bulk of the Association of British Chambers of Commerce, however, had long been  hostile. They had found it easier to negotiate with partners in Australia, or anywhere in the English speaking world on the other side of the earth, who shared a common language, judicial system, commercial law, banking connections, insurance companies and moral values, than with foreigners across the English Channel. As the English used to  say, Africa starts at Calais. By 1961, even the ABCC was favourable to entry.

 

Negotiations and French veto.

 

Once the government had applied, negotiations started between British experts and those of the Common Market. Most technical issues were settled satisfactorily, with the exception of horticulture and sugar. The most difficult issue was that of the Commonwealth. Trade with the Commonwealth might be less important for Britain than it used to be, the opposite was not necessarily true, and some Commonwealth countries still relied heavily on Britain. Trade with Britain represented 82 % of the foreign trade of Mauritius, 51% of Nigeria’s, 56% of New Zealand’s , 33% of India’s, Ceylon’s, and Australia’s. Members of the Commonwealth in Africa and the Caribbean were given free access for their exports of raw material and foodstuffs, India for manufactured goods and tea, Canada, New Zealand and Australia for wool and jute.

 

This heralded the Lomé Agreements in the I970’s, designed to help countries of the ACP regions (Africa, Caribbean, Pacific) obtain access to European markets.

 

    In spite of the experts’ work, British entry was vetoed twice by France, in 1963 and in 1967. General De Gaulle’s motivations are still a matter for speculation, and should be distinguished from the official reasons which were given at the time.

His motivations were probably based on the conviction that Britain was, and would remain in the predictable future, culturally, politically and strategically oriented towards the rest of the English speaking world, including the USA. Britain was therefore different from all the continental European countries, whose outlook was dominated by their mutual relationships, and who had no links with a vast overseas population, sharing the same culture, and exerting  a significant  influence over world affairs.

 

 This was and largely remains true. British identity differs considerably from French identity, in the sense that it is not determined by a relationship with a particular territory, or by an administrative decision. It is based on culture, and is differentialist. This explains  why  British citizens abroad can remain British, not only from an administrative point of view, but also psychologically and politically, and never integrate the host societies, whether they live in Dordogne or the heart of Africa. Foreigners (i.e. non British) may be respected, and their cuisine appreciated,  but , whether they live in Britain, as immigrants, or in their own country, they are and will remain philosophically different, and will never be considered as equals. This view is put forward by French anthropologist Emmanuel Todd. English speakers will always be considered as closer allies than “foreigners”, even if they have an Australian accent.

 The French abroad integrate very fast , and lose their French identity rapidly, not bothering to register with French consulates . French identity is linked to place, to birth, or to the administrative decision which granted them  nationality, irrespective of their colour, language or religion. As defined by republican philosopher Ernest Renan, French identity means “the desire to share a common destiny”, i.e.  the building of republican France. This is based on the conviction men are fundamentally equal, irrespective of their culture and nationality,  and explains both the ideal of integration for immigrants and the rapid   identity shift  for the French who live abroad permanently.

German identity is again different, and was traditionally based on blood, or “race”: it could only be transmitted by direct lineage. People of German ancestry living in Russia or in Romania for centuries were generously given German passports, and granted German social rights,  in the 1990’s, even though they were not born in Germany, did not speak the language and had Russian or Romanian nationality. Conversely, the children of Turkish immigrants born, educated and working  in Germany found it impossible to obtain German nationality. Germany shares with the UK a differentialist outlook, based on the notion that national differences are permanent.

 

The political consequences of such differences in outlook are, and were,  considerable. On the one hand, the military links between the US and the UK were, and remain obvious. Whatever the political differences, the rivalries and ill feelings, solidarity has remained absolute between the two countries in the military field. The Nassau agreement, in I963, demonstrated that the relationship was indeed becoming even closer. The first veto was explained by strategic considerations of this type.

The second veto was provided with a different explanation: the British economy was facing such difficulties that,  De Gaulle said, it would wreck the common market in the case of integration. One should therefore wait for Britain to recover first. In fact, in the mid 1960’s, France was the enfant terrible of the Common Market, and attempted with some success to impose its own views on its partners, in a way which heralded Mrs Thatcher’s tantrums in the 1980’s. France refused to a large extent the political logic of European integration, the element of federalism which was present in the Rome Treaty. De Gaulle wanted to preserve French sovereignty at all costs, from European encroachments as well as from American pressure: France withdrew from the integrated military command of NATO, and there were no American troops left on French soil. This infuriated France’s neighbours and European partners. In European institutions, France practiced the politique de la chaise vide, refusing to attend meetings, and managed to convince its partners to leave aside most of the aspects of European integration for which provision had been made in 1957, and to concentrate on one aspect only: the Common Agricultural Policy. The agreement is  known as the Luxemburg Compromise. This determined the shape of European policies, and expenditure,  for the next 30 years. By the late sixties, agriculture represented 80% of European expenditure. There is no doubt this would have been impossible, had Britain been a member of the Common Market. The Common Market was moving in a direction favourable to France, but totally inimical to British interests. That the CAP , and the British contribution to the budget, should have been at the heart of the crisis of the 1980’s should not come as a great surprise.

 

After the veto.

 

There was a sense of relief in Britain after the second veto, even if true pro Europeans were disappointed. The big leap into the unknown was postponed for a few years.  France and Britain engaged in diplomatic exercises, known as “bridge building”, aimed at restoring good relationships in spite of the differences between them. The  decision to jointly build the Concorde was a case in point. New buildings were also erected for British and French cultural institutions in Paris and Oxfo

Britain in Europe.

 

Renegotiating British membership: 1979-1986

 

Welcoming deregulation: the Single European Act.

 

 Refusing the logic of political integration and of the Maastricht Treaty.

 

 The Maastricht Treaty

 

From the ratification of Maastricht to the victory of New Labour.

 

European Policy under New Labour. 

 

 

Renegotiating British membership.

 

The ideological  ambiguities of Thatcherism

 

 

Thatcherism was a political practice which combined elements borrowed from different political traditions, namely liberalism and conservative traditionalism.  This explained its success in the UK, since it covered a very wide spectrum, but also its lack of coherence, and ultimately, its inability to meet the challenge of European integration. Indeed, Margaret Thatcher’s inability to lead a rational  European policy  was one of the two reasons why she fell from power in 1990. In the case of Britain, and of the English speaking world in general, the philosophical opposition between liberalism and conservatism has structured political debates since the 18^th century. This is not the case in many other European countries , and especially in France, where economic liberalism has usually been associated with right wing political forces , with a brief exception between 1830 and 1848.

 

Liberalism.

In the name of Liberalism, Margaret Thatcher, who governed Britain between May 1979 and November 1990, welcomed the economic evolution undergone by  the European Union in the 1980’s, in two fields: the abolition of tax barriers and of protective practices between member countries, on the one hand, and the deregulation of all European markets on the other hand. Besides, she accepted with enthusiasm the old  argument in favour of joining, namely that the bracing winds of competition would force British industry to improve its productivity and the quality of its products if it wanted to remain in business: this would be important not just in order to export on the European continent, but also to remain competitive at world level.

 In economic terms,  Thatcher was therefore a keen pro European leader, in tune with the ideas prevailing among experts and most governments in the 1980’s, even though she seemed more extreme than most. During this decade, the theories and policies advocated by John  Maynard Keynes were gradually abandoned by all European governments. Even socialist France abandoned the Keynesian priorities in 1982/1983. The restoration of full employment, and reflationary policies designed to boost production and employment were gradually discarded by François Mitterrand’s governments, under the influence of the French Minister for Finance and Economics , Jacques Delors. Delors, the father of the French austerity package known as “Rigueur”  became President of the European Commission, and his views became extremely influential at European level in the late 1980’s. 

The new economic priorities had been more or less defined by a group of economists called the “Chicago school”, or the “monetarists”. Their leading stars were Milton Friedman and Friedrich Hayek. According to the monetarists, the chief priority of governments should not be the restoration of full employment, but the control of inflation. Inflation, according to the monetarists, was the result of an excessive supply of money, relatively to the national output, i.e. the goods  or services produced by the economy. It was therefore necessary to reduce the supply of money, which could be effected by keeping the creation of money by governments under control and by reducing public borrowing. Monetarists considered the market as natural phenomenon, and state intervention as inefficient and politically objectionable. They failed to see any difference in nature between the command economies of Eastern Europe, and the social market economies of Western Europe, where public sectors and private sectors coexisted.

The existing nationalized sectors were seen as the thin end of a wedge, which would lead ultimately Europe into “totalitarianism” and slavery     (Milton Friedman’s first book, published just after the Second World War, was entitled “The Road to Serfdom”).

The laws of competition should be respected, since tampering with them would only result in inefficiency, a waste of public money, higher taxes, and inflation. Ailing firms, the “lame ducks”, as the press called them,  should NOT receive public subsidies.

The scope of government intervention should be as limited as possible, for two reasons: borrowing was bad, since it bred inflation, and taxation  was also objectionable, since it penalized the active, successful citizens, and reduced the incentive for work and initiative. Tax should NOT be used in order to reduce social inequalities, but just to provide the state with a (limited ) income.

 Wages should only be determined by the market. There is such a thing as a natural level at which employers are prepared to pay workers. This is the natural level for wages. Interference with this, whether by powerful trade unions or governments imposing a minimum wage,  can only have disastrous consequences. British workers, so Thatcher said, had “priced themselves out of a job”: they had imposed high wages, making their employment unprofitable. (This was challenged by many analysts, who pointed out that the problem in the UK was not the level of wages, but the relatively low productivity of industry.)

Unemployment was a natural phenomenon. If it helped  national economies adjust to the world economy, by persuading workers to accept lower wages, harsher working conditions, or more flexibility, then it would play a positive part.

During the 1970’s, the inflation rate had risen dramatically in Britain, which persuaded governments that their priorities should change. Besides, governments were at a loss, and could not make sense of the crisis, which had many different aspects. The crisis had political, cultural  and psychological aspects as well as economic ones, and the decline of Britain to the status of a middle range, ordinary European country was hard to accept. Margaret  Thatcher held a very synthetic discourse in which all different aspects intertwined, and the arguments reinforced each other. The Labour party, in the 1970’s, was divided. Part of it clung to the old Keynesian  theories. The leading section  implemented, in practice, the policies recommended by the monetarists even before Mrs Thatcher won the 1979 elections.  In the rest of Europe, the ideas of the monetarists  exerted a growing  influence. France was the last country to abandon the social priorities of Keynesian economics, and was forced to do so by the growing trade deficit its reflationary policies had brought about in 1982. Germany was particularly attracted by the concern of the monetarists for  inflation, for historical reasons. During the Weimar republic, in the 1920’s, Germany had experienced extremely high rates of inflation, which had brought about the general impoverishment of the population, and the rise of the Nazi party. Inflation was therefore treated as a very serious matter in Germany, whereas it was practically a permanent feature in other European countries, such as Italy.

The impact  of monetarism, first  within the English speaking world, and then in Europe,  helped Britain exert a considerable influence over economic decision making in the European Union. This influence was long lasting, and is evident in the so called “Maastricht critieria” included in the Maastricht Treaty in 1990. The countries which wished to apply for membership of the European monetary system had to abide by strict economic criteria , among which a limited public deficit. Even though Britain did not adopt the Euro, thatcherite  liberal, monetarist ideology pervaded decision making in the EU. Besides, economic liberalism, which was at the core of Thatcherism, also became integrated in European discourses and public policies, thus diluting the specificity of the European social model. After a decade of deregulation and privatizations, Europe became more similar to the United States, although, in the 1990’s,  this became , and still is, extremely controversial and the subject of fierce social and political struggles.

                                   British liberalism came to play a much more active part within the EU than ever. The indirect influence of British ideas and policies over the EU must not be underestimated, and far exceeds the direct influence of British governments.

 

Conservatism

            However, Thatcherism included other elements than liberalism. It purported to restore British national influence and pride by the most traditional of policies, including the nurturing of the “special relationship” with the USA, and totally rejected the option adopted by other European countries, that of the “pooling of sovereignties”.  Thatcherite conservatism bears little relationship with the European issue. Nevertheless, the promotion of a specific form of “britishness”, including opposition to the integration of immigrants, confrontation with Argentines over the futile, symbolic issue of the Falklands, opposition to any proposal emanating from continental European countries, and blindfolded kinship and solidarity with the United States of America had a very lasting impact on the nation, which can be still felt today.

In other words, Britain totally refused the logic of the Jean Monnet method. For Monnet, economics were a means to an end, and economic integration was just a tactical move, intended to lead to the strategic master plan of political integration. For Thatcher, economic deregulation was the one and only goal, and any move impinging upon British sovereignty would be, and was fiercely resisted. As long as Europe was happy with deregulating its markets, Britain was a keen supporter of this policy. When the political dimension appeared, with the discussion of the Maastricht Treaty, Thatcher fell foul with most European governments.

 

Haggling about the British contribution to the Community’s budget.

 

  The first half of the Thatcher decade was dominated by a crisis, which not only affected the relationships between the UK and the European Community, but also paralysed the Community as a whole. The object of the conflict was the amount of the British contribution to the Community’s budget. The deep causes of the conflict lied in the fact Britain considered  community policies as structurally imbalanced, since they had been designed long before Britain was allowed to join, and suited the interests of other member states. Germany, an industrial nation, could export its goods to the whole of Europe. France reaped most of the benefits of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). Britain, whose industry had been weakened by the crisis if the 1970’s, and whose small but efficient agriculture did not need European subsidies, did not benefit from the European integration process as much as its partners.

  Conversely, Britain was expected to pay a very heavy contribution, which was calculated on the basis of:

the common external tariff. The more a country imported from the rest of the world, the higher its contribution. Naturally, since the British economy was more geared towards international , non European exchanges, than that of its neighbours, it was expected to pay a lot. In terms of agricultural imports, Britain imported, traditionally, a very large proportion of its needs from outside the Community.

a 1% levy on member  countries’ Value Added Tax. The higher the domestic consumption , the higher the contribution.

 

The contribution seemed all the more unacceptable to Britain , since  it did not benefit from the Community’s expenditure. The only expense which had been built in the Community’s structure, and which was compulsory and automatic, concerned agriculture. Whenever prices fell below an agreed level, farmers received European subsidies. This meant that they were encouraged to produce large amounts, irrespective of demand and of the reality of the market: their income was guaranteed even if there was an over production. The British press was full of horror stories about the beef mountain (surpluses of beef, stocked and deep frozen at great expense), the butter mountain and the wine lake.  This was not only a waste of money, but an offence against the laws of the market, which are taken very seriously in the UK. British farmers only received 5% of CAP subsidies up to 1982, and 10% afterwards.

The other expenses of the Community were the European Social Fund and the European Regional Development Fund. In the early 1980’s, they were not very significant, since  poor South European  countries only  joined the Community later (Greece in 1981, Spain and Portugal in 1986). Britain learned quickly how to tap those resources, but expenditure on the ESF and the ERDF was capped. Over a certain ceiling, the budget could no longer increase. This was not the case for agriculture, where expenditure was unlimited. Expenditure on the ESF and the ERDF did not exceed 10% of the Community’s expenditure.

When Britain had joined in 1973, it had been agreed that its contribution would increase very slowly, from zero in 1975, to £ 178 million in 1976, and  £ 900 million in 1979, the year Margaret Thatcher became the tenant of 10 Downing Street. Had not Thatcher won the elections, the crisis would have broken out all the same, although her particularly abrasive style enlivened the negotiations.

During the Dublin European Summit of 1979 she exclaimed: “I want Britain’s own money back ! “

The forecasts for 1980 were ominous. Britain would have had to pay £ 1 200 million, which would have represented 60% of the Community’s expenditure. Thatcher was quite unrepentant about the size of American imports. Negotiations were held in May 1980, as a result of which both parties felt satisfied. Thatcher told the House of Commons she had won, and the French and German governments refused to accept the principle put forward by the UK, that of “Fair Return” ( “Juste retour” in French).  This principle amounted to a negation of the Community’s very existence. It meant that a country should not contribute more to the European budget than it would get in return, through one programme or another. No solidarity would have remained between strong and rich countries on the one hand, and weaker ones on the other.

Continental Europeans were therefore firm on principles but very understanding in practice, since Britain was experiencing an economic downturn in the early 1980’s.

It was agreed the British contribution would only amount to £ 335 million in 1980 and £ 425 million in 1981. In fact, Britain only paid £ 200 in 1980 and nothing at all in 1981.

 

Encouraged by this success, Thatcher demanded new rebates in 1982. Britain should have paid £ 870 million for 1982, but an agreement was eventually reached, and the amount reduced to £ 480 million. This new crisis sums up in a nutshell the evolution of Community policies during the 1980’s. Irritated by Britain, who threatened to block an agreement on farm prices, continental Europeans decided to change the rules, and to deepen the process of European integration. They used majority voting in order to reach an agreement on agricultural prices, instead of the old rule of unanimity. A short term, financial victory for Britain, (who obtained a huge rebate) had to be paid for politically since  , in practice, the UK lost  its right of veto on the essential issue of agriculture

Both France and Germany felt enough concessions had been made. A lot of time was wasted over such negotiations, whereas efforts should have been geared towards the smooth integration of the new and future  members (Greece Spain Portugal), whose per capita income was clearly  lower than that of the UK. Britain was no longer the poor man of Europe, and did not deserve a special treatment.

 

In 1984, a new crisis was opened by Britain, who refused to vote the European budget, on ideological grounds. The Conservative House of Commons felt the Community, where many countries were dominated by socialists, was over spending. The Community  was paralysed for over a year, including the Erasmus exchange programmes for university students. The matter went to the European Court of Justice, and a compromise was, again, struck in 1986.

 

Britain succeeded in reducing significantly its contribution to the budget, thus avoiding to pay the price  of  its heavy reliance on foreign trade with the USA and other non European countries. British foreign trade with the Community was changing. Exports to the EU only represented 15% of the total in 1955, 32% in 1974 and 42 % in 1980. The trend was unmistakeable, but British integration in world markets was a reality. In the I980’s, most American and Japanese investments in Europe went to Britain. In the long run, this preserved the special status of Britain, as a European country exerting influence in the EU, but at the same time a peculiar offshore outfit, at ease with globalization, and closely linked to the USA. Continental Europeans felt differently. To some extent, the considerable leap forward which the Single European Act of 1986 and the Maastricht Treaty of 1990 represent for European integration was due to a reaction, on the part of Continental Europeans, against British obstruction in the early 1980’s.

 

A world view dominated by the cold war and by solidarity with the USA.

 

         The first half of the 1980’s was the last years of the cold war, which nobody at the time could imagine would end so quickly, after Perestroika and the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989. Military strategists in the West seriously considered the possibility of an armed conflict in Europe. Evidence appeared that the USA were even seriously contemplating a limited nuclear war on the “European theatre”. They required the support of their allies for the deployment of  tactical nuclear missiles , i.e. short and medium range ones which could hit Soviet troops in Eastern Europe – and, incidentally, Eastern Europe itself-  without affecting the Soviet Union . The Soviets, it was believed, would refrain from using strategic, long range missiles against the USA if their own territory was not hit. The two superpowers could therefore escape relatively unscathed from a limited nuclear conflict, which would weaken, or eliminate, their European clients. This was a nightmare scenario for many European governments  and public opinions. Margaret Thatcher remained, throughout this period, one of the most faithful allies of the USA. Britain accepted the deployment on its soil of large numbers of American tactical nuclear missiles, the “Cruise Missiles” equipped with nuclear warheads. The British Peace Movement , called the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, was presented as unpatriotic, but mobilized hundred of thousands of demonstrators.

         In return, Mrs Thatcher obtained American support during the war it led against Argentina, when a British expeditionary force was sent to the South Atlantic in order to recapture the Falkland Islands (“Malvinas” for the Argentines), which had been seized by Argentina. This American support was not only effective in  terms or electronic intelligence, gathered thanks to spy satellites and eavesdropping. It was also very significant politically, and could not be taken for granted . This was the first time the USA supported a former colonial power, the UK, against an American nation, in clear breach of the old Monroe Doctrine. Besides, the Argentine dictatorship largely drew its origin from an operation mounted by the CIA in Latin America, called Operation Condor, designed to eliminate physically left wing leaders and militants. The military alliance between the US and the UK was strengthened by the support provided by the USA, and helped promote the Echellon network. This is an international network of electronic “intelligence” (i.e. spying), integrating the intelligence agencies all English speaking countries. It enables the USA and its clients to eavesdrop on all telephone conversations in the world, and on all Internet communications. Britain currently operates one the most powerful listening posts of Echellon, and  GCHQ (“Government Communication Headquarters”), employs literally  thousands of technicians, translators and agents at its  Cheltenham base.  Clearly, Echellon represents a  breach of European solidarity, since it is used against other European countries, including France.

         Solidarity with the USA went even beyond the realm of defence in this period. The USA had elected a very conservative Republican President, Ronald Reagan, who was ideologically very close to Margaret Thatcher. The USA preached the doctrine of monetarism, even though they did not necessarily apply it to their own public deficit. With British support, they  imposed monetarist policies to the rest of the world, thanks to the International Monetary Fund and even the World Bank. The so called “structural adjustment policies” imposed on third world countries, consisting in reducing public spending and avoiding deficits, contributed to the rise of world poverty in this period, and became very controversial. The roots of the anti globalization movement, and of anti American and anti British feelings in many countries can be found partly at least in those policies.  In international terms, Europe remained a virtual reality, with a lot of potential, but no achievements.

 Britain imported a lot of American policies in many areas. Privatizations, the deregulation of  services, aggressive,  confrontational strategies against trade unions, indifference towards industrial firms which faced bankruptcy, the encouragement of private wealth accumulation, all  gradually changed the nature of British society. Britain, since the war, had been an industrial welfare state, in which  public services enabled ordinary people to share , to some extent,  the benefits of economic prosperity. Under Margaret Thatcher, Britain became a service society, where industry became marginal, and where the collective culture one associated with industry also  collapsed. Public services could then be described by using the phase the American economist JK Galbraith had used in the 1960’s to describe the USA: “ Private affluence and public squalor”. There was a lot of wealth about in the UK, but it was concentrated in private hands. Public services declined in the fields of health, education, public housing  and transport. British Rail, which , in the 1960s, was an efficient and modern national network, was divided into rival private companies. The British train service, slow, expensive,  unreliable  and accident prone,   became one of the worst ones in Europe,  comparable only to that of the USA, where it is largely marginal.  Until 2003, when the service was modernized, Eurostar travellers from Paris to London shot through the North of France, only to grind their way through the Home Counties of the South of England . As President Mitterrand said diplomatically “On a le temps d’admirer la belle campagne anglaise”.  By the mid 1980’s, 12 million citizens were said to live below the poverty line. British society was nevertheless rich, and richer than it had ever been in history. Will Hutton, a popular sociologist, said Britain had now become a 40/30/30 society. 40 % of the population were doing quite well, thanks to the rise of new technologies, the communication industry, banking, the rise in real estate prices. Their taxes were cut by Mrs Thatcher, to whom a lot remained faithful. The next 30 % were in employment , but did not make a lot , and were in danger of losing their jobs. The bottom 30 % were either unemployed,  in poverty, or had very precarious, flexible jobs which did not provide a sufficient income for them to live without social security benefits.  This is very close to the American pattern and very far from the traditional British  one, in which the poor were less numerous, and were considered as part of the working class, and politically and socially integrated. The americanization of British society was largely completed by the mid 1980’s.  The conservatives remained in power until 1997, which  would imply that a significant section of the population accepted this situation. In terms of mentalities, the philosophy of the market came to pervade the whole of the nation, and even modified the ideology of the Labour party.

 

 

2. Welcoming Deregulation: the Single European Act, 1986.

 

 

  The Milan summit, on June 28^th 1985, adopted the conclusions of a White Paper on the achievement of a domestic single European market, commandeered  by the European Commission to a team of experts, and validated  by  the Commission. The paper, called “The costs of Non Europe”, (also called after the name of the expert in charge of the team, “The Cecchini Report”), proposed:

The elimination of physical borders

The elimination of technical borders

The opening of public markets

The free movement of workers and professionals

The free movement of services

The liberalization of capital flows

The elimination of all physical barriers.

 

By 1986, the Single European Act had been signed by all members of the European Community.  Clearly, the method was economic, but the goal was political. The next step would obviously be the Maastricht and Amsterdam treaties. The European Commission was then led by a very dynamic and committed president, Jacques Delors.  The strange thing is not that the Act was signed, but that it should have been necessary at all, since all the proposals were already included in the 1957 Rome Treaty. Why was the Single European Act necessary ?

Among the reasons for this decision was the fact that the economic crisis, since the 1970’s, had led many governments to adopt protectionist moves, such as public subsidies for ailing sectors  (e.g. steel manufacturing in France and Germany), or even market protection. All attempts by the European Commission at encouraging the mobility of workers, a feature which already featured prominently in the Rome Treaty, had failed.

The Rome Treaty itself was largely ignored, and seemed increasingly at variance with the actual practice of governments. As years went by, it could become totally irrelevant if nothing was done.

The difficulties created by Britain during the negotiations on the British contribution and the CAP paralysed the Community, and deprived it of any element of idealism and political ambition.

The European market was still largely divided because of

Different rates of VAT.  For example, VAT on cars amounted to 28% in France, 14% in Germany, 15% in the UK and … 173% in Denmark.

Different sanitary regulations, used largely to protect national markets. The British regulations on the import of pet dogs and cats, motivated by protection from rabbies, also conveniently protect British breeders from European competition.

Different policies as regards imports from third countries (i.e. non European) . France limited the import of new Japanese cars to a maximum of 3% of all new cars.

Different norms and technical regulations, which were used systematically as a protectionist device. German brewers used a law on the “purity of beer” to stop French beer from crossing the Rhine. French cassis de Dijon could not be exported to Germany either, because it was too potent  (32°) to be considered as wine, but not strong enough to qualify as spirits. A famous case was fought in court over this.

 

The economic, political  and psychological impact of the Single European Act, adopted in 1986 and enforced in 1992, was considerable.

 

Eliminating physical borders.

 

This was naturally a very liberal move, in the  political as well as the economic sense of the word. Individuals would be able  to circulate without any kind of control, and no quotas would be imposed for individual imports, provided they were used for individual consumption. Goods imported from the rest of the world would only be controlled once, at the port of entry, which raised a number of problems for the automobile sector, since Britain imported Japanese cars  and car parts very freely. This definitely increased competition, and exposed all European industries . Sanitation regulations were supposed to be unified as well.

Britain welcomed the economic aspects. A thriving individual import industry now exists between Britain and supermarkets in the North of France, where many goods, including alcoholic beverages,  are cheaper. However, Britain insisted on the need to retain passport controls , in the name of the fight against illegal immigration, terrorism and crime. In fact, the decision seems to be more political and symbolical than practical. There are no identity cards in the UK, and citizens are not expected to carry  proof of their identity when are stopped by the police. This is considered as an essential feature for a free country, and attempts at introducing an ID card have always been fiercely resisted.  However, serious criminals or highly motivated illegal immigrants are not likely to be deterred by passport controls at the border. The massive increase in travel makes border controls problematic,  unless electronic or biometric data  are included in passports. Such data  became  necessary in order to obtain the right of entry in the USA in 2003 .

The British European Commissioner  Sir Leon Brittan said that border controls were irrelevant in the struggle against transnational crime. Nevertheles, they were maintained, either as a symbolical gesture, or a transitional measure, until more efficient controls are invented.

One can say that, to some extent, political liberalism remains  an essential  British feature, but that it does not apply to foreigners.  

 

Eliminating technical frontiers.

 

Norms had been fixed independently, without any kind of cooperation, and this was used as a protectionist device. The solution which had been theoretically adopted by the European Community in the past consisted in adopting the highest standard for consumer protection. This was unrealistic, and extremely slow. Countries were ecological consciousness appeared at an early stage, and was higher, such as Germany and the Netherlands, had very high standards , for example concerning automobile pollution, and the fumes coming out of exhaust pipes. They had taken stringent measures which, in effect, would have meant the scrapping of a large proportion of the road vehicles circulating in France, and most South European countries.  Besides, the new clean catalytic exhaust pipes were all manufactured in Germany. Consumer protection and ecological concerns could easily become a new form of protectionism. 

The new approach was more flexible. It consisted in saying that all technical norms were deemed equivalent within Europe . If a product was acceptable in country A, country B could not use its own norms to exclude it. Contrary to what was feared in some quarters, German roads were not swamped with unsafe, rattling   French or Spanish vehicles leaving a trail of stinking black smoke behind them.

However, this solution was not entirely satisfactory. Norms remained different for lamps, or plugs, as anybody trying to use an electric appliance in a different European country will have discovered. Britain remained particularly isolated in this respect. It had specific norms, and its safety standards, such as those for electrical appliances, were very high indeed. They still are much higher than French ones. Besides, although Britain slowly turned metric  in many fields in the 1970’s, the old habits died very slowly, and workers were used to specific lengths, weights, volumes  and gauges, unknown on the continent.  Such details created a certain amount of  aggravation and fed anti European feelings in the UK.

 

Opening public markets.

 

Britain was particularly happy about this, since this quintessentially liberal decision was in tune not only with the new, rather shrill discourses of monetarist pundits  and thatcherite politicians, but also with traditional British culture. Britain is very different from France in this respect. In France, the involvement of the State in industry is traditional, and has a long history, starting under Louis XIV and his minister Colbert. The history of French capitalism is very different from that of Britain’s. In France, the State will often identify the areas in which it feels industrial expansion should be encouraged, invest heavily, use its scientific and managerial expertise in order to develop the industry, use State authority to exclude foreign or private competitors if necessary, and even create a market by purchasing the goods itself, or by forcing French consumers to buy them. The French telecom, aircraft, space, nuclear, railways  and even construction industries are a case in point. French supporters of Colbertisme will point out that it is in fact very efficient, and that , whenever the country did not resort to this practice, indigenous private capitalism failed dismally. This connects to the debate on the anthropological roots of capitalism, and Weber’s thesis. On the other hand,  this argument would imply  that the new European economic model is closer to the North European, Protestant, competitive  and capitalist cultures than to those of Southern, egalitarian nations, where the role of the State was different.

         Britain  is perfectly at ease with  the new European philosophy . The British government never had an industrial policy. British capital will be readily exported, provided the opportunities are good. Investing in European public services seems a natural avenue for British financial institutions. Opening Britain to foreign investment is not problematic either. Traditionally, 50% of American investments in Europe went to the UK.  The argument of “national sovereignty” or “national interest” is not presented in the same ways as in France. The litmus test, for capital, is profitability. The only point of a business is to make a profit, not to produce goods or create employment. Britain needs a profit making financial sector, efficient firms, whoever owns them. Jobs are a by product of profits. When the British company manufacturing military helicopters, called Westland, went bankrupt, several options were at hand. The company could be taken over by a European consortium including British Aerospace, but also German and French companies, or it could be bought by an American company called Sikorsky. Margaret Thatcher exerted pressure in favour of the American option, which, a few months later, led to the resignation of her defence minister, Michael Heseltine. The American option was adopted.

 

The free circulation of workers and professionals.

 

 

The circulation of workers was already a provision of the Rome Treaty, but, in practice, the Common Market led to little mobility for ordinary workers. Highly skilled, and well paid professionals are more mobile. British doctors, who, as public employees, are less highly paid in the UK than in liberal (USA) or quasi liberal systems (eg France), have a tradition of mobility. Many emigrated to the US, and  Britain compensated for this loss by welcoming doctors from poor countries (eg Egypt). Emigration was therefore not a new idea, contrary to the situation in France. British law and accountancy firms were well placed to make the most of the increase in the free circulation of professionals. They had a lot of expertise both technically and in the export of their services.

Besides, all state employment in Europe was now open to European nationals, except police forces, which  created opportunities in fields such as teaching.

 

A Common market for services.

Fields such as financial services and transport are areas where Britain excels. Small, low cost airline companies are a case in point , and benefited a lot from the changes.

 

Freedom for capital flows.

 

In  a situation where all financial operations become possible between two European countries, competition will naturally favour those countries that have the most liberal (i.e. cheapest) taxation system, and the highest interest rates. This was the case for Britain, which also had the best and the oldest financial institutions in Europe, and very competitive insurance companies. The change suited perfectly the interests of the City. New technologies meant that the existence of a separate currency, the Pound, would not seriously hinder exchanges. There is a lot of evidence that this was indeed the case.

 

The elimination of tax barriers.

 

Britain was in the European average, with a VAT set at 15%, whereas France had a standard rate at 18.6 % and a high rate at 33,5% . It would no lose much.

In terms of “sin taxes”, i.e. the excise duties levied on alcohol, tobacco, and petrol  the situation varied widely. Britain had very heavy taxes on alcohol, and, at the time, low ones on tobacco and oil. This was due to a mixture of economic considerations (the UK was an oil producing country, did not produce wine etc ) and complex ethical ones. Duties on petrol increased a lot in the 1990’s, but the issue of taxes on alcohol is so entangled with cultural, ethical or even religious factors that differences remained enormous within Europe.  Duties on alcohol remain very high in the UK compared to French ones. This  explains the success of supermarkets in the North of France, which do a brisk trade with British customers.

 

Conclusion.

The economic impetus and the advantages of the greater European market were enormous, and it became impossible to imagine that Britain could remain aloof from the process or withdraw from economic integration. However, the political side of integration was another matter. Besides, technical difficulties in the way of economic integration remained. Such problems had a political dimension, as well as a practical one.

The difficulties concerned the fields of transport, higher education  and public procurement.

All quotas  for national carriers in the area of road haulage were theoretically abolished in 1988. However, this led to a crisis, since Germany , fearing foreign competition, insisted on specific controls. The hours of work of lorry drivers, - a very controversial issue, on which wide variations still exist in practice within the EU- and the reliability of monitoring devices, recording driving hours and speed, remained under the control of national governments. In 1990 a special tax was created in Germany, levied on foreign lorries entering the country. This is compounded by the fact that private carriers from Southern and Eastern Europe are believed by public opinion in Northern countries to flout the regulations concerning working  hours and pollution norms.

The mutual recognition of diplomas remained a virtual reality. In 1988, the principle of mutual recognition was adopted by the 12 member states. However, this is only a very general principle, which remains largely meaningless. It only affects degrees delivered  at year 3; i.e. the French licence of British Ba. It leaves aside all diplomas delivered at year 2, whose value on the European job market is low. Outside France, few universities award diplomas after 2 years of training.  It does not affect either post graduate diplomas, such as French Maîtrises, DESS and DEAs, British Masters etc.  In the case of post graduate diplomas, the UK functions on the basis of absolute competition between institutions, on the basis of their prestige. The basic fee for postgraduate British students is at least £ 3000 (4500 Euros) . For students from outside the EU, the fee is often over £ 10 000. Even in the case of BAs, British universities operate as a market, even though the fee is a standard one and has so far remained low. The difference  between the market value of a BA from a prestigious university (e.g. Oxford or Cambridge) and from a less prestigious one is considerable. This is both due to real differences in standards, and to social factors. This is unequalled on the continent, and especially in France, where the market values of all licence diplomas is strictly similar, and bears no relation to the university which delivered them. It would  therefore be rather unrealistic to expect British institutions and British society to award the same kind of value to a foreign diploma as to a British one, since their own system  functions like a  domestic market. To some extent, European academia is drawing closer to the British model, based on all out competition. This is already the case for masters professionnels in France (the old DESS). The original philosophy of European integration, implying the respect of national approaches to public services, and their gradual replacement by European standards, was gradually replaced, in the course of the I990’s, by the neo liberal approach, based on competition, and modelled on the USA. This is a highly controversial issue, since what is at stake is the existence of a specific European model, distinct from the American one.

Finally the directive on public procurement, stipulating that all public authorities, including local authorities, must open their supply contracts to tenders from any EU country, was resisted. French public industries (EDF) or private firms (e.g. water supply companies) were quick to export their services, but did not necessarily welcome European competition . This was the case all over Europe. Water works in the UK were privatised under the conservative governments, and the fact that French companies , which have a lot of expertise in this field, invested heavily in the sector was the subject of  much criticism in the British press. This issue remained a difficult one well into the XXIst century.